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How to Break a State: The Habsburg Monarchy’s Internal War, 
1914-1918 
 
In late spring 1915, Trieste went dark. The city, boasting a population of over 200,000 
and nestled along the Adriatic Sea, was one of the Habsburg Empire’s most important 
commercial centers. It lay perilously close to the border with Italy, which for months had 
threatened to abandon the Triple Alliance and invade Austria-Hungary. As war loomed, the local 
military commander ordered all lights in this busy port extinguished. Trieste’s citizens, Italian 
and Slovene-speakers along with many other peoples and ethnic groups, complied with the 
Army’s will. And yet, one building flaunted the order, questioning the military’s authority. That 
building belonged neither to the local socialist club, nor to an Italian nationalist organization. It 
housed the office of the Statthalter, the imperial governor of Trieste and the surrounding 
Austrian Littoral. Personally appointed by the emperor, the Statthalter was the highest ranking 
civilian official in the province. The military commander, perturbed by the governor’s defiance, 
ordered the night patrols to shoot them out.
1
 
One could see this standoff as a product of local interpersonal relationships on the 
periphery of the Habsburg Empire. But we think it is indicative of the larger issue of military 
necessity and the rule of law in the twentieth century. When the local commander ordered his 
troops to fire on the governor’s office, he opened a new front in a war raging in the Habsburg 
Empire since July 1914. Weapons in this war consisted of the patrols rifles, to be sure. But they 
also were made with arguments, mounds of paper that discussed the use and abuse of emergency 
                                                 
1
 Austrian State Archives [herafter OeStA] Kriegsarchiv [hereafter KA], Neue Feldakten [NFA], 5. Armee-
Etappenommando (SW Front), Vorfälle Triest, k.u.k. Stationskommando in Triest to the 5. Armee 
Etappenkommando, Res. Nr. 350 “Abblendung aller Lichter – Kundmachung,” July 16, 1915, Karton 1092. 
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legislation, with military necessity on one side and the constitutionally-sanctioned rights of 
citizens and the rule of law on the other. This internal war pitted the Habsburg Army against 
Austrian and Hungarian officials and the front cut through every village and town in Habsburg 
central Europe. It was a war on the Habsburg Rechtsstaat, the state government by the rule of 
law—the state as it had existed since 1867. 
Historians of the Habsburg Monarchy and of the Great War in general have overlooked 
this internal war, focusing instead on a predetermined Habsburg collapse stemming from 
national conflict, deep traditions of autocratic and anti-democratic governance, or a combination 
of the two.
2
 These larger arguments about Habsburg decline have been exceptionally tenacious 
within First World War histories, even as they downplay the role of World War I in bringing 
about the empire’s collapse.3 Twenty-five years of American and Austrian historiography on late 
imperial Austria-Hungary has largely reversed such verdicts on the long decline of the Empire.
4
  
The new orthodoxy holds that the Habsburg state was a vibrant constitutional polity, strongly 
                                                 
2
 See, for instance, Lewis B. Namier, “The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy,” in A History of the Paris 
Peace Conference, ed. Harold W. V. Temperley, vol. 4, 6 vols. (London: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 
1921), 58–119.  Josef Redlich, a Professor of Political Science at the Technical University in Vienna, was a key 
architect of the argument that pointed towards weak parliaments and a cumbersome administrative system inclined 
towards autocratic solutions.  Thisappeared as Josef Redlich, Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im 
Weltkriege (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1925); Josef Redlich, Austrian War Government, Economic and 
Social History of the World War 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929). Others stressed the problems of 
nationality more consistently.  For classic statements of this argument, see, Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, Phoenix edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).  
3
 Robert Kann’s statement that “What happened within a few war years is in essence only an abstract of a 
long-drawn out process of decline” exemplifies this approach to the war.  See, Robert A. Kann, A History of the 
Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 468. More recent 
treatments have echoed this approach and this mindset: Geoffrey Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of 
World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Prit Buttar, Collision of 
Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014).  
4
 Gary B. Cohen, “Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy: New Narratives on Society and Government in Late 
Imperial Austria,” Austrian History Yearbook 29, no. 1 (1998): 37–61.  The most prominent works along these lines 
are: Gerald Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs, 
1848-1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985); Pieter M. Judson, 
Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 
1848-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference 
and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
3 
 
committed to rule of law, and able to command the loyalty and the political imaginations of its 
subjects.
5
 This historiography has focused on “those features of the Imperial political system 
which contributed to its stability and functionality, however marginal,” as John W. Boyer called 
for in his study of Christian Socialism.
6
 The fact that the Monarchy functioned as a great power,
7
 
that its parliaments passed budgets,
8
 expanded social welfare for its citizens,
9
 and created the 
basis for expanding economic development in years before 1914,
10
 means that we need a history 
                                                 
5
 Daniel L. Unowsky, The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 
1848-1916, Central European Studies (Purdue University Press, 2005); Laurence Cole and Daniel L. Unowsky, eds., 
The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg 
Monarchy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). 
6
 John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 
1848-1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), xiv. 
7
 Diplomatic history has generally been the branch of history that is most willing to see the Habsburg 
Empire as a declining power. See here Solomon Wank, “Varieties of Cultural Despair: Three Exchanges between 
Aehrenthal and Goluchowski,” in Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from Maria 
Theresa to World War I: Essays Dedicated to Robert A. Kann, ed. Stanley B. Winters and Joseph Held, East 
European Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); F. R Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy 
Among the Great Powers, 1815-1918 (New York: Berg, 1990); Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, 
Grandseigneur und Staatsmann., 2 vols. (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1963). 
8
 The work of Lothar Höbelt has been instrumental in revising our understanding of Austrian parliamentary 
politics. See, above all, Lothar Höbelt, “Parliamentary Politics in a Multinational Setting: Late Imperial Austria,” 
Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota Working Paper, no. 92–96 (March 1992); Lothar Höbelt, 
Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs, 1882-1918 (Vienna: Verlag für 
Geschichte und Politik, 1993). See also the essays in Volume VII of the Habsburgermonarchie series on 
parliamentary politics in Austria and Hungary, Adam Wandruszka, Peter Urbanitsch, and Helmut Rumpler (eds.), 
Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973-), 
vol. VII: Verfassung und Parliamentismus; for Hungarian politics, see especially, László Révész, “Der Ungarische 
Reichstag 1858 bis 1918: Rechtliche Grundlagen und praktische Umsetzung,” in Ibid, vii/1: 1007–60; András Gerő, 
The Hungarian Parliament, 1867-1918: A Mirage of Power, East European Monographs 470 (Boulder, Colo., 
1997).  
9
 Margarete Grandner, “Conservative Social Politics in Austria, 1880-1890,” Austrian History Yearbook 27 
(1996): 77–107; Kurt Ebert, Die Anfänge der modernen Sozialpolitik in Österreich: Die Taaffesche 
Sozialgesetzgebung für die Arbeiter im Rahmen der Gewerbeordnungsreform (1879-1885), Studien zur Geschichte 
der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie 15 (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1975). 
10
 Economic history was the branch of history to suggest that the Habsburg Empire may have actually had 
some life in it before the First World War. See the now-classic studies David F. Good, The Economic Rise of the 
Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Richard L. Rudolph, Banking and 
Industrialization in Austria-Hungary: The Role of Banks in the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873-
1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); John Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: 
Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1983). 
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of World War I in the Habsburg Monarchy that takes the pre-war story of a vibrant and evolving 
multinational empire into account.  
If the Habsburg Empire should be seen as a functioning, evolving state, why was it 
abandoned by its peoples and why did it fall?
 11
 Many things contributed to this abandonment: 
deprivations of every kind, from food shortages to a lack of consumer goods; enormous war dead 
which touched every village and town in the empire; and the disjuncture between battlefield 
victories against Serbia, Romania, Italy, and Russia and privation at home.
12
 These reasons 
explain growing discontent. To this we want to add what we see as a deep fundamental crisis in 
state legitimacy and rule of law, a crisis which arose out of extralegal emergency measures (the 
state of siege, or the state of exception) intended to make the Habsburg state effective in event of 
war. 
What is striking about this state of exception and the suspension of the rule of law is how 
unexceptional it was. Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy all had provisions to suspend normal 
political activities and tighten state and / or military control of the economy, the press, and civil 
                                                 
11
 Czechs traditionally been seen as the great traitors of the empire. But recent studies of the Czech 
experience of the First World War have been paradigm shifting in this regard, demonstrating that Czech politicians 
and everyday citizens largely supported the empire until the end of the war, much like the other national movements 
of the monarchy. See, Ivan Šedivý, Češi, české zeme a velká válka, 1914-1918, Česká historie 7 (Prague: 
Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2001); Richard Lein, Pflichterfüllung oder Hochverrat? Die tschechischen Soldaten 
Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg, Europa Orientalis 9 (Vienna: LIT, 2011); Claire Morelon, “Street Fronts: 
War, State Legitimacy and Urban Space, Prague 1914-1920” (Ph.D. Thesis, Centre d’histoire de Science Po & 
University of Birmingham, 2015). 
12
 Much of the most compelling recent work on the Empire has focused on the impact of the provisioning 
crisis in urban centers. In Vienna, Maureen Healy has traced the declining legitimacy of the Habsburg State in the 
eyes of everyday citizens as the war dragged on and the state asked for more and more sacrifices from them to 
sustain the war. Maureen Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in 
World War I, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare 17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). A similar stress on the centrality of the provisioning crisis appears in two recent works on Bohemia, 
see,  Rudolf Kučera, Život na příděl: válečná každodennost a politiky dělnické třídy v českých zemích 1914-1918, 
Vyd. 1, Knižnice Dějin a současnosti, sv. 49 (Prague: NLN, Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2013). John David 
Robertson, “Calamitous Methods of Compulsion: Labor, War, and Revolution in a Habsburg Industrial District, 
1906-1919” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014). See also the Minister for Food 
Supply’s memoirs, Hans Loewenfeld-Russ, Im Kampf gegen den Hunger: Aus den Erinnerungen des Staatssekretärs 
für Volksernährung, 1918-1920, ed. Isabella Ackerl, Studien und Quellen zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte 6 
(München: Oldenbourg, 1986). 
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rights.
13
 These provisions often met with protest and unrest, but not the collapse of the state 
itself. Seen from this perspective, the Habsburg Empire’s internal war over the rule of law is the 
loudest and most jarring note in a coda to a broader global historical era, the age of imperial 
revolutions from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That coda revolves around 
the destruction of the age of revolutions’ primary, if at times highly contingent, legacy: the 
practice of rule of law embedded in the nineteenth-century constitutional state.
14
  
This war on the Habsburg Rechtsstaat was the hottest front of a broader assault on the 
nineteenth-century constitutional state and rule of law across the world.  Europe under the crisis 
of the First World War formed the fulcrum of this conflict.  It was the moment at which rule of 
law in its nineteenth-century sense, one that promised constitutions and political rights, appeared 
decisively set backward.  With different local contexts, valences, and timings, Qing China, 
British India, large swaths of Latin America, other portions of the British Empire, and the United 
States were part of this crisis of the nineteenth-century constitutional state and rule of law.
15
  
                                                 
13
 Recent theoretical work on the state of exception and its general unexceptionality in the twentieth 
century, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).  
14
 This is not to suggest that constitutional state was the inevitable outcome of this age in a teleological 
sense, but to maintain that a concern with constitutionalism was very prominent, whatever it might have meant in 
local contexts and exposed to a range of transnational influences.  Moreover, concern with constitutionalism and 
rule of law did not exclude empires, but joined them and self-proclaimed nation states.  On the centrality of 
constitutionalism, see, Linda Colley, “Empires of Writing: Britain, America, and Constitutions, 1776-1848,” Law 
and History Review 32, Nr. 2 (May 2014): 237-266; Jeremy Adelman, “Liberalism and Constitutionalism in Latin 
America in the 19
th
 Century,” History Compass 12, nr. 6 (2014): 508-516.  Jeremy Adelman refers to a “second 
Atlantic constitutional conjuncture” from the mid-nineteenth century forwards in Argentina.  See, Jeremy Adelman, 
Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 288.  
15
 In the case of Imperial China, earlier generations of Western scholars tended to over-instrumentalize the 
role of law in late-Imperial Chinese society.  See, William P. Alford, “Law, Law, What Law? Why Western 
Scholars of China Have Not Had More to say about Its Law,” in Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman, and R. Kent 
Guy, eds., The Limits of Rule of Law in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015), 45-64.  Alford points 
out that the rule of law in 19
th
 century China came under pressure as the result of tensions between the central and 
provincial governments that were only exacerbated by large scale rebellions such as the Taiping Rebellion.  Still, 
many people viewed procedures in criminal cases as “having the capability of dispensing justice.”  See, William P. 
Alford, “Of Arsenic and Old Laws: Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in Late Imperial China,” California Law 
Review 72, no. 6 (Dec. 1984), 1236-1238; 1242-143.  On British India and the British Empire more generally, 
6 
 
Earlier generations of historians might have written this story as part of the crisis of liberalism, 
but this unnecessarily narrowed the geographic and thematic focus of this crisis to particular 
countries and political persuasions.  Moreover, this narrative of liberalism tended to concentrate 
historians’ focus on a particular set of political goals; whereas we believe the focus should be on 
the practices and frames of the nineteenth-century state. Such a focus allows us to see elements 
of practice even in states whose liberal revolutions failed or never even took place.  The 
Habsburg story likewise offers us a telling commentary on the collapse of the constitutional 
state: namely that the constitution could come under assault directly from within the state itself 
and not from an external mass political movement.  The Habsburg Army’s internal focus in the 
war concentrated on the legalistic practices of Habsburg state officials and the compromises that 
arose from a state and civil society that were deeply inflected with one another. And it was the 
war, and the extrajudicial measures provided by the state of exception, that together provided an 
enormous wedge for the Habsburg Army to wield against the practices of that Habsburg 
Rechtsstaat.   
The First World War would require belligerents to call upon their citizens to make 
profound sacrifices to stay in and prosecute the war. Scholarship of recent decades has made the 
stories of these sacrifices better known. The story we wish to tell, is the story of a different kind 
                                                                                                                                                             
scholars have pointed to the claims for rule of law within the British colonial administration and the ways in which 
the practices of the administration could at the same time undermine those claims. See, Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial 
Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
Lauren Benton makes a powerful argument for the way in which rule of law had to contend with other types of law 
over the course of the nineteenth century and in the colonial sphere its dominance was always questioned and 
uncertain.  She stresses that rule of law should not be placed in a dichotomy against lawlessness.  See, Lauren 
Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  For the establishment of rule of law’s in Britain, see, E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: 
The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975).  Progressive era America also exhibited a range of social 
and state pressures with regard to rule of law that threatened at times to instrumentalize it.  See, Michael Willrich, 
City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Elizabeth Dale, The Role of Justice: The People of Chicago Versus Zephyr Davis (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 2008).  This is not to dismiss the power of legal procedure and rule of law.  Even in the Jim Crow 
South, legal procedures and the rule of law could prove stubborn against entrenched and volatile popular racial 
prejudice.  See, Suzanne Lebsock, A Murder in Virginia: Southern Justice on Trial (New York: Norton, 2003).   
7 
 
of sacrifice, a sacrifice of the rule of law. When the rounds from Habsburg patrols shattered the 
Statthalter’s windows in Trieste, they were part of a larger shattering of faith in the rule of law 
across Europe. This tragedy, set in motion by the First World War, would have global 
implications for the twentieth century, but no more than in Habsburg central Europe.  
I. 1914 
The Great War radically shifted the relationship between state and citizen across Europe. 
Stalemate in the West, a ranging front without decisive, knock-out victories in the East and 
South East would force military elites and politicians to reach deep into the state’s toolbox to 
coordinate economies, societies, scientists, and armies toward the goal of survival and victory. In 
the field of such coordination, military necessity could become the military’s trump card as 
generals mobilized arguments for ranging outside the established boundaries of military 
control.
16
 
                                                 
16
 The literature on the expansion of military authority within European belligerents is vast.  Gerhard Ritter 
provides the classic statement on the German Army’s expansion of institutional power within German society during 
the war.  See, Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Modern Germany, vol. 3: The 
Tragedy of Statesmanship: Bethmann-Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914-1917) and vol. 4: The Reign of German 
Militarism and the Disaster of 1918, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1967-1973).   
On Germany, see also, Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), Roger Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-
1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Roger Chickering provides an up to date overview in the 
German case in, Roger Chickering, “Imperial Germany’s Peculiar War, 1914-1918,“ The Journal of Modern History 
88 (December 2016), 871-877.  The commander of the Italian Army, Luigi Cadorna, was convinced that the civilian 
government failed to appreciate the demands of the war and believed that leftist political parties were outright 
hostile to the war.  See, John Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 107-108; 114-115.  On civil-military tension in Russia, see, Michael Cherniavsky, ed., Prologue to 
Revolution: Notes of A.N. Iakhontov on the Secret Meetings of the Council of Ministers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1967), 229-230; Daniel W. Graf, “Military Rule behind the Russian Front, 1914-1917,“ Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas 52, no. 3 (1974): 388-401; Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia 
during World War I (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999), 216-48; Eric Lohr, “The Russian Army 
and the Jews: Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence during World War,“ Russian Review 60, no. 3 (2001): 406-
408.  Recent debates on France in the First World War have concentrated less directly on the issue of civil-military 
relations per se and focused on the the concept of “war culture“ in which the problematic of civil-military relations 
is dealt with less directly, at least in an institutional sense.  See, Leonard V. Smith, “The ‘Culture de guerre‘ and 
French Historiography of the Great War of 1914-1918,“ History Compass 5/6 (2007), 1967-1979; Leonard V. 
Smith, “France, the Great War, and the ‘Return to Experience,‘“ The Journal of Modern History 88 (June 2016): 
380-415.  
8 
 
But more than such intrusions into mobilizing citizens to work and produce for the war, 
and more than censorship and propaganda that would control information flows to the 
combatants’ citizenry, Europe’s militaries frequently mobilized arguments of military necessity 
to take control of law and juridical procedure. Such incursions into the basic constitutional 
guarantees that had built over the course of the nineteenth century were a phenomenon that 
would spread beyond Europe. They would be deadly for the Habsburg Empire, where war 
necessity and military incursions into governance and juridical procedure eroded the Habsburg 
state’s claim to legitimacy based on maintaining rule of law as a sphere separate from state and 
society.  
The declaration of a state of emergency on 25 July 1914 changed the entire legal system 
of the Monarchy, in both Austria and Hungary. This system was framed by three separate 
constitutional regimes: Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The central framework was 
built with the Great Compromise of 1867, which split the Habsburg Empire into two separate 
domestic regimes (Austria and Hungary), each with its own constitution, parliament, prime 
minister, and ministerial cabinet.  This system (known as dualism) provided each half of the 
Monarchy power over its own law, administration, and domestic policies. Foreign policy was the 
prerogative of the Emperor-King, Franz Joseph. Accordingly, the Habsburg Empire had a “joint 
cabinet” that reported directly to the emperor and consisted of a Foreign Minister, a Minister of 
War, a Finance Minister, and the Austrian and Hungarian Prime Ministers. Bosnia was appended 
to this Dualist arrangement in two stages: occupation and subsequent Austro-Hungarian 
administration of the province came in 1878 at the end of the Russo-Turkish War. In 1908, the 
Habsburg Empire surprised Russia and much of the Balkans by annexing Bosnia outright.
17
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 On Habsburg imperial foreign policy before the war, see especially Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: 
How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2012), chap. 2, 5, and 6. See also Samuel R Williamson, 
9 
 
A varied political landscape was the rule in Austria-Hungary. If Bosnia had a provincial 
parliament and some autonomy, it was—crucially—administered by a high-ranking general who 
reported to the Joint Finance Minister in political-administrative matters. Austria was, in 
contrast, a constitutional monarchy with an imperial parliament (Reichsrat) elected by universal 
male suffrage. Hungary had a parliament too, but its suffrage laws gave Magyars dominance 
over Romanians in Transylvania, Slovaks and Ukrainians in the north, and Serbs in the south. 
Moreover, the Great Compromise granted Hungary numerous concessions that provided for a 
different relationship between Hungary and joint monarchical institutions. Most importantly, the 
Great Compromise stipulated that the joint army could not be used in Hungary without the 
government’s permission.18 
For military elites, this constitutional landscape and the politics that emerged from it 
exacerbated the forces of fragmentation, prevented a rational distribution of state resources 
(especially military spending), and fueled national tensions that threatened the Monarchy’s 
existence.
 19
 The Army’s ire often focused on the administration.  As Isabel Hull reminds us, 
civil-military relations cannot be measured against an abstract and idealized notion of how they 
should properly function, but have to be understood within the specific governance context of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, The Making of the Twentieth Century (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1991); F. R Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers. 
18
 On the Great Compromise of 1867 and the Habsburg Army, see Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, “Der 
Ausgleich von 1867 und die k. u. k. bewaffnete Macht,” in Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867. 
Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen, ed. Peter Berger (Vienna and Munich: Herold, 1967), 113–26. On the political 
system in Hungary under Dualism, see László Péter, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn,” in Die 
Habsburgermonarchie. Volume VII. Verfassung und Parlamentarismus (Vienna: ÖAW, 2000), 239–540; József 
Galántai, Der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus 1867-1918 (Budapest: Corvina, 1990).  
19
 Günther Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”: Die Führung der k.u.k. Armee und die Grossmachtpolitik 
Österreich-Ungarns 1906-1914, Studien zur internationalen Geschichte 13 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003). For 
examples of the anti-political habitus of the army, see the weekly magazine, Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung, which was 
published between 1899 and 1919 and was a continuation of Alfons Danzer’s Neue Armee-Zeitung. One of the 
magazine’s frequent contributors was no less a figure that the future general and military historian, Hugo 
Kerchnawe, who published numerous books which made similar arguments about Austria’s loyal military and its 
deeply pathological political system. See, for instance, Hugo Kerchnawe, Die Vorgeschichte von 1866 und 19?? 
(Vienna: C.W. Stern, 1909). 
10 
 
particular polity. For Hull, Imperial Germany offered an example of polity where a chaotic 
system of governance allowed the Imperial German Army to indulge in an increasingly narrow 
and blinkered approach to solving strategic problems through concentrating on operational 
excellence.  By contrast, civil-military relations within the Habsburg Monarchy were 
characterized by an increasingly hostile set of oppositions between the Army, the state 
administration, and broad swaths of the political classes. These oppositions focused elements of 
the Army leadership on fending off challenges from the administration and political classes as 
well as the potentialities of broader internal state reform. 
Theodor Ritter von Zeynek, who became the chief of the Quartermaster section in the 
AOK (Army High Command), remarked on the increasing hostility and isolation of the army vis-
à-vis the rest of Habsburg society in his memoirs. Things were better during his time in school 
when “Ministers and provincial governors were not emissaries of some political power center, 
but exclusively confidants of the Kaiser himself.”20 For Zeynek, officers’ increasingly distant 
relationship to Franz Joseph was due to what he considered emperor’s excessive regard for the 
administration, obsessed with legality, and the fact that this administration “sullied” itself by 
working with Austria-Hungary’s politicians. In everyday routines, the administration and the 
officer corps inhabited different worlds, according to Zeynek. Officers began the day early, 
finished by early afternoon, and moved on to the Gasthaus. Bureaucrats started work later, taking 
a break in the middle of the day and worked late into the night. The misperceptions such 
schedules engendered provided easy material for charges of laziness and neglect on both sides. 
Social interaction was minimal, as Zeynek noted during his experience with an infantry regiment 
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in Galicia. A “latent state of war” between the administration and the Army prevented a 
“community of interest” between the two.  This, he explained, “made itself felt in a very negative 
way during the war.”21 
A key point of conflict centered on nationality politics. In Austria, the Imperial 
administration frequently worked with political elites from national parties to write and craft the 
compromises that led to smooth governmental functioning.
22
  In a larger sense, such 
compromises, only possible through continued credence lent by the rule of law, were intrinsic to 
the broader global constitutionalist project in the nineteenth century.  Yet, the anational Army 
believed such compromises reflected the administration’s abdication of its proper role in society. 
For instance, in 1912 General (Feldzeugmeister) Oskar Potiorek lodged a complaint against the 
State Prosecutor’s Office in Dalmatia; he complained that it too frequently followed the letter of 
the law instead of fighting disloyalty, irredentism, and anti-military and anti-dynastic 
propaganda.
23
 In particular, Potriorek wondered why the local governor failed to suppress a 
series of Italian irredentist propaganda pamphlets. The Superior State Prosecutor’s office in Zara 
/ Zadar, Dalmatia, responded by arguing that one pamphlet that Potiorek mentioned was not 
confiscated because its contents cover “events from long ago, events which belong to the annals 
of history.” The other was harmless. The Prime Minister’s office forwarded these lines to the 
War Ministry without comment. But there was growing discontent in the War Ministry—and on 
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the general staff—with the administration’s assessments. They were too “optimistic,” as one 
report from 1912 noted. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, chief of the general staff, weighed in.  He 
invoked Field Marshall Radetzky, writing that this mid-nineteenth-century military hero said 
“the civilian administration will describe everything as harmless until events would prove him 
right and make their own perspective null and void.”24 Such exchanges demonstrated not only 
the conflict between the Army and administration but also their radically different levels of 
tolerance for dissent. 
Army leaders were also focused on an intensifying European arms race which they 
believed left the Monarchy far behind.  From recruiting contingents to artillery acquisition, the 
Army felt its problems received little budgetary attention.
25
  For the Army, this was not the result 
of Austria-Hungary’s small industrial base.  It fixated on internal political issues that it believed 
prevented the creation of a military force on par with that of other European powers. Part of this 
went back to the constitutional organization of the Monarchy. Dualism created two parliaments, 
an Austrian one and a Hungarian one, and a joint body called the Delegations, which meant that 
military budgets and troop contingents passed through multiple levels of oversight and scrutiny 
before approval.  And approving budgets meant more political concessions. In Austria it might 
mean largess for nationalist political groups; in Hungary, it might mean more constitutional 
concessions, solidifying Hungarian exceptionalism. 
The Army believed these constitutional structures provided a rotten framework that 
allowed politics to pervert the Habsburg state. As opposed to viewing the rule of law as an 
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element intrinsic to state legitimacy and sovereignty, the Army viewed it as a naïve accessory to 
the imperial demise abetted by a blind state administration whose commitment to the letter of the 
law blinded it to manifest subversion within the Empire. Moreover these political failings, 
whether they encouraged national separatism in Austria or political separatism in Hungary, were 
abetted by a state administration that exacerbated political and national tensions in the state 
instead of ameliorating them.
26
 Such disquiet meant that the army leadership was on the lookout 
for ways to make systemic changes to the Habsburg Monarchy. In the years leading up to the 
First World War, one source of hope was the impending succession of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand to the Habsburg throne. His death at the hands of Gavrilo Princip, paradoxically, 
would provide another path. 
The declaration of war on 28 July 1914 gave the military the cover it needed to assault 
the constitutional structures and political life of the Habsburg state. Like the other states in 
Europe on the eve of the war, Austria-Hungary had emergency legislation in place to be 
activated in wartime. Emergency legislation provided a “backdoor” and allowed the suspension 
of constitutionally-granted rights and privileges, supposedly to provide for a smooth mobilization 
and to prevent sabotage by internal or external elements. 
 The Army's intervention into the Monarchy’s constitutional system was made easier by 
the fact that there was not one backdoor, but three. Emergency legislation for each constitutional 
regime: one each for Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
27
 All three sets of emergency 
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legislation authorized the suspension of constitutional rights in “instances of war, in the 
preliminary activities to war, as well as in cases of internal disorder which are either treasonous 
or threaten the constitution or personal security.”28 Austrian emergency law left the specifics of a 
state of exception open, to be determined at a later date, while Hungary and Bosnia had the 
specifics of the state of exception explicitly spelled out. Emergency legislation was developed in 
secret by the War Ministry, the General Staff, and liaisons in the Monarchy’s administrative 
units. These three sets of emergency laws were then supplemented by “Orientation-Aids” (one 
each for Austria, Bosnia, and Hungary). These booklets, which contained everything from drafts 
of requisitioning and surveillance laws to telegraph codes, were released to subordinate military 
commanders and administrative offices, the last iteration of which appeared in 1912.
29
 The 
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Orientation Aides provided legal levers that would ease the Army’s intervention into the political 
life of Austria and Bosnia in particular. 
Two days before the Habsburg Empire declared war on Serbia, 26 July 1914, the state of 
emergency went into effect across the Monarchy. In Bosnia, which had already seen the Army 
displace independent civilian authorities in 1912, an imperial order announced the transfer of 
authority from the civilian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the military commander 
there, Oskar Potiorek.
30
 Once he held both the reins of civilian and military authority, Potiorek 
immediately issued no less than fourteen emergency decrees, suspending civil rights and 
enforcing military control over border crossings, and increasing military control over post and 
telegraph, residence registration, supervision of the press, requisitions and things generally 
considered key to supporting the war.
31
   
Bosnia was always a unique province and its proximity to the front with Serbia gave 
Potiorek a potent argument for special security measures. Bosnia’s backdoor was the easiest to 
open; the second one, Austria’s, was next. There the Austrian Council of Ministers met on 23 
July to put in place the wartime legal order. The agenda dealt with the role of the government 
vis-à-vis the central parliament and the provincial legislatures, as well as the legal transition to 
general war administration.
32
 They implemented the ordinances contained in the Orientation-
Aide. Decrees that suspended personal freedoms guaranteed in the constitution (civil and 
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property rights, right to assemble, privacy of correspondence, and freedom of the press) appeared 
along with penalties for “disturbance of the public peace” and interfering with mobilization. It 
suspended right to trial by jury and placed civilians under military legal jurisdiction for an array 
of offenses. Finally and tellingly, the collection of emergency measures contained a new law that 
regulated the “cooperation of municipal and state officials regarding the defense of the country” 
and provided for prosecution and punishment of civilian officials for dereliction of duty.
33
 The 
law subjugated all public officials to military overwatch. 
Such measures, contained in the draft of the orientation aides and which military and 
civilian officials drafted together, were to be temporary and accompany mobilization. Initial 
civilian assent to military supremacy was underscored by the Austrian Prime Minister, Count 
Karl von Stürgkh. In a memo sent to provincial governors on 26 July 1914, Stürgkh wrote that 
“the military events that stand before us” make it imperative that “all organs of the state 
administration unite with the fullest devotion and collective might to serve the armed forces with 
the utmost effort.” Stürgkh’s memo evoked patriotism, self-sacrifice, and asked imperial officials 
to energetically support the war as model citizens. “Considerations of administrative expediency, 
considerations on moods of the parties, consideration of the current or future conditions of 
internal politics, all this has ceased,” Stürgkh explained, “there is only one thing to keep in mind: 
the orientation of all forces of the state for the safe, rapid and complete achievement of the 
purpose of war.” The armed forces “now have been ordered to enforce the state’s will,” and the 
bureaucracy was expected to relinquish its autonomy and independence as a pillar of state to 
support victory in war.
34
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In Hungary, the state of emergency, by contrast, gave the civilian government new 
powers, allowing it to mediate between military and society at large.
35
 Thirty-three separate 
emergency ordinances went into effect.  This included the appointment of government 
commissars, responsible for “the maintenance of public order and security in harmony with the 
military commanders, and...ordinary administrative measures...necessary in the interests of 
successful prosecution of the war.”36 In other words, Hungary’s emergency legislation afforded 
new controls to the government and provided for a new civilian official to supervise emergency 
legislation and public order. This, de jure at least, was to keep the state of exception within 
civilian control.
37
 But Hungary’s constitutional autonomy would likewise come under threat. 
Stepping into the constitutional breech, overpowering the Emperor’s extra-constitutional 
prerogatives and using them to their own ends, military officers sought to ignore and abrogate 
Hungary’s constitutional guarantees, which were far more robust. Such blatant attacks on 
Hungary’s guarantees quickly came to the attention of Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, 
who spent over three years tirelessly combatting military overreach and demanding that it be 
corrected. And yet the very difference he maintained for Hungary divided him often enough 
from joining forces with his beleaguered counterparts in the Austrian half of the Monarchy. 
 Mobilization and the declaration of war allowed the military’s anti-political habitus to 
find full expression. The Army could use the war to finally create the Habsburg state it sorely 
wanted. To do so, however, it would have to take the power of the emperor into its own hands. 
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Carl Schmitt, in his 1922 work, Political Theology, defined the concept of sovereignty in terms 
of the sovereign himself. The sovereign, he writes, “is he who decides on the state of 
exception.”38 Austria-Hungary’s emergency legislation placed the defense of the realm in the 
hands of the emperor and supreme war lord. When its emergency laws were passed in the late 
1860s by liberal governments, the emperor was in his prime. By 1914, the punctiliously 
conscientious Franz Joseph had reached elderly status. Born in 1830, he was nearly eighty-four 
when hostilities began. More to the point, Franz Joseph felt old. With the declaration of war and 
the state of emergency, Franz Joseph found it difficult to maintain the balance between the army 
and civil society that the Monarchy’s emergency legislation demanded.39 He may have decided 
on the state of exception, but quickly the old emperor’s sovereignty would be overrun by a series 
of challenges from the military.  
*** 
How important is the rule of law? Nineteenth-century liberal political thought argued that 
law constituted a moral space separate from the state and society.
40
 Such thinking undergirded 
the nineteenth-century state’s political architecture. The state of war could change such state 
architecture radically as ideas of military necessity took on a special role as a first principle of 
decision-making. In all cases, such a threat came out of the very constitutional legislation that 
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secured the rights of citizens in the first place. The French law on the state of siege of 3 April 
1878 allowed the military to take over the police and court jurisdiction for certain crimes against 
the safety of the republic or the constitution.
 41
 These were capacious powers indeed, but even so, 
the limits of the law were quickly exceeded at the start of the First World War. The state of siege 
allowed for a limited declaration for specific communes, districts, or departments which were 
caught up by the imminent danger of war or insurrection. The period of siege was supposed to be 
fixed by a law, approved by parliament within two days, and set to expire at a certain time. 
Though in 1914, President Raymond Poincare declared a state of siege for all of France that had 
no expiration date.
42
 Immediately, then emergency trumped the letter and limits of the law. 
Germany, too, allowed for a capacious definition of military authority in the state of war.
43
 The 
declaration of war there followed the exercise of article 68 of the German Constitution and 
placed local civilian government under the control of the military district commander.
44
 
Coupled with such legislation, the military articulated ideas of objectivity through a 
discourse of military professionalism.
45
 Such claims of objectivity positioned the military to see 
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itself as a neutral arbiter in the political arena, able to occupy an apolitical, moral position from 
which they could evaluate, assess, and condemn. It also presented a latent potential for military 
encroachment—through claims of necessity or emergency—into the civilian sphere, whether in 
the sphere of legislation, governance, justice, and economic management. As the First World 
War became drawn out, militaries increasingly used arguments of war necessity, and the need to 
respond to an atmosphere of crisis, to make policy that had been reserved for the civilian 
sphere.
46
 Such thinking is commonplace now, in the world of terrorism and military 
interventions in Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand. The crisis of the nineteenth-century constitutional 
state in the First World War made a game plan for how constitutional and military regimes 
would interact in periods of crisis.  
Thus, when the Habsburg Empire’s military apparatus launched an assault against the 
constitutional state that emerged over the course of the nineteenth century, it was but one of 
several constitutional states that came under threat. What differentiated Austria-Hungary from 
other states in Europe during World War I, and what makes it particularly interesting to study, 
was the immediate occupation of political-juridical authority by the army at the outset of the war. 
Coupled with this was a particularly charged environment when it came to civil-military 
relations. This context made Habsburg Army interventions into imperial society during World 
War I so destructive. The Empire’s deep attachment to rule of law, within a relatively well-
functioning political system built upon compromise, made the Habsburg state unprepared for the 
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wantonness of the Army’s assault just as it made the military incursions into political and 
civilian life so destructive.
47
  
On the verge of the war, it seemed that the Army was being brought into the fold of the 
Habsburg Rechtsstaat as demonstrated by the successful and long sought after reform of the 
Habsburg Army’s system of military justice.48 The Habsburg Army, however, identified the 
Habsburg constitutional and rule of law state as an existential threat to the Empire from within.  
The close intersection of politics and administration, the legal framework that developed around 
this intersection, and the compromises it produced were the Army’s targets.  The Army stepped 
off its assault from what it considered the corruption of “rule of law” in the Empire, coming up 
with its own alternatives to the positive application of law and directing these alternatives against 
civilian politicians and administrators.  
But because Austria-Hungary began the war with such a stark regime change, without the 
effects of a creeping power, the contrast between civilian authority and war administration 
evoked a violent juxtaposition. Signs of a new regime stretched across Austria-Hungary at the 
start of the war. Further the military administration would be less predictable and more arbitrary 
in dealing with the Monarchy’s citizens than what they had come to expect from their respective 
governments in nearly five decades of constitutional rule before July 1914. Moreover, the civil-
military context of the Habsburg Empire meant that the Army held an affective disposition to 
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read potential military setbacks through a lens of administrative and political failures prior to the 
war, only emboldening it in its aggressiveness vis-à-vis the Habsburg state. Unlike the German 
case, the fissures at home opened up immediately with the start of the war. The emperor’s 
weakness played into the Army’s hands. Emergency legislation provided a road-map for a 
military invasion, not just of Serbia or Russia, but of the Habsburg state itself.  While legal 
scholars from Carl Schmitt onwards have argued that rule of law and the state of exception were 
deeply connected, recent scholars writing in this vein have argued that in spite of emergency 
laws, the limits of the state of exception were incredibly difficult to contain and delineate. For 
the Habsburg Army, this state of exception was more than a requirement for successful military 
mobilization in the first months of the war. It was an opportunity to clear away the problems of 
Austria’s political system, with its dense web of connections between the administration and 
local political elites. But just as emergency legislation closed Austria’s parliamentary bodies, it 
wiped away nearly fifty years of constitutional evolution—the evolution of political praxis in 
both halves of the monarchy.
49
 This rupture made the state a less familiar entity to its citizens 
and no longer the plodding, but inherently calm and predictable polis it once was. If, particularly, 
the Austrian state functioned through dealings and compromises forged between the central 
administration in Vienna and the Polish, Czech, Croatian, Slovene, and Italian political elites in 
the corners of the empire, by shuttering parliamentary bodies the bureaucracy lost its contact 
with the populace that gave the state its legitimacy among its various peoples.
50
 Moreover, the 
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Austrian state was no longer ruled by set norms, adjudicated in court cases of administrative law. 
Justice, procedures, precedents, and decisions became more emotive, haphazard, and arbitrary.
51
 
This arbitrariness was in evidence as Army authorities sought to implement their form of 
justice, a justice unhinged from the framework of the rule of law, in the Monarchy's heartland, 
Styria. There the local Slovenian population was exposed to the brunt of military authority due to 
simple coincidence. The town of Maria-Rast / Ruše in Slovene-speaking South Styria held a 
Sokol festival on 28 June, the very day that Franz Ferdinand and Duchess Sophie were murdered 
in Sarajevo. This celebration of a Slavic cultural festival combined with a Catholic feast day 
became cause for arbitrary arrest and persecution. The declaration of martial law (and thus the 
placing of justice under the military) in the Monarchy’s south Slavic regions gave occasion for 
what Martin Moll called the “blind rage of the domestic security forces and military justice.”52 
Gendarmes arrested and the military court in Graz prosecuted almost everyone in Maria-Rast / 
Ruše who participated in the festival. They were charged with enemy activity against the state 
and “Serbophile machinations.”53 As the Army began to direct the efforts of the local gendarmes 
against Slovenian politicians and activists in Styria, they increasingly brought anyone who 
participated in these national festivals into their nets.  
From the beginning some civilian authorities attempted to cooperate with the Army. 
Alfred Fries-Skene, the governor of Carinthia, oversaw the internment of nearly 100 Slovene 
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priests in Carinthia. The military, with Fries-Skene’s cooperation, directed local police to arrest 
anyone remotely suspicious. By early August, reports arrived in the Interior Ministry that priests 
in Slovene-speaking areas were being arrested, thrown in prison, and charged with a variety of 
crimes, including “unpatriotic behavior,” “disturbing the peace,” lèse majesté, even espionage.54 
Many Slovene priests—like Father Johann Schneditz in Viktring / Vetrinj—were arrested for 
pre-war behavior, not for crimes committed after the war began.
55
 Schneditz was a well-known 
Slovene-phile and had ruffled the feathers of local German nationalists, who took the increased 
vigilance of the war as an opportunity for payback. The district prefect of Klagenfurt, in a report 
to the Governor, maintained that war made the arrest of Schneditz necessary. “The agitation of 
the populace and the past [activities] of Father Schneditz were of such a nature, that his 
provisional internment in police custody may...have been justified, lest all the rest of the 
population fall into misfortune on account of this rabble-rouser.”56 Schneditz’s arrest ignored the 
law, norms, and procedures that governed the administration of justice in the Habsburg Empire. 
As the military interacted with civilian authorities in Styria, it instrumentalized law to root out 
dissent, national politics, imprison nationally-minded priests, and establish far-reaching political 
control over the populace. 
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While Fries-Skene in Carinthia worked with military authorities, the Governor in 
neighboring Styria, Count Manfred Clary-Aldringen, fought what he called the “eagerness” of 
the Styrian Gendarmerie and “mistakes” and “missteps” by the Army.57 Clary-Aldringen actively 
intervened in the Styrian press to keep reports of the arrests from stirring national antagonism 
and implored the Interior Ministry to investigate such arrests.
58
 For Clary-Aldringen, the problem 
was that news of Army persecution of Slovenes was blamed on the political administration. He 
drew Vienna’s attention to the matter. After an investigation uncovered—through internal 
spying—an order from the provincial military command to seek out and arrest Serbophile 
elements, Stürgkh began to realize the extent of the Army’s judicial takeover. He characterized 
the Styrian Gendarmerie as “reckless” and their methods as “deliberately ignoring the civilian 
authorities in the arrest of so-called suspicious persons.”59 By September it was clear to everyone 
from Clary to Prime Minister Stürgkh, even the emperor himself, that an “overzealous” Army 
arrest and prosecution campaign was veering out of control.
60
 
Despite the Army's more limited remit in Hungary given its emergency laws, Prime 
Minister István Tisza was dealing with a similar situation. An earlier order by Franz Joseph to 
restrain the Army after complaints from Tisza in late July 1914 was released and then undercut 
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two days later by Archduke Friedrich, the leader of the Army High Command 
(Armeeoberkommando), who maintained that the war meant one should not “take too much 
account of internal political considerations” when it came to internal subversion.61 General 
Alexander Krobatin, the War Minister, admitted later that “The arrests result almost solely at the 
instigation or through the order of military command and military authorities.” He further noted 
that the Hungarian Prime Minister had intervened numerous times with little effect: “on the 
contrary, there have resulted numerous, highly unpleasant misunderstandings and conflicts 
between the civilian and military authorities” there.62 Tisza wrote to the emperor only a few days 
before to complain about “unauthorized abuses” committed by military authorities in Hungary. 
These mirrored the events in Styria. Tisza reported that “several hundred so-called suspicious 
persons were arrested on the basis of various denunciations, including retired Field Marshall 
Lieutenant Nikolaus Cenna [sic]….” Tisza added that spurious denunciations spurred arrests of 
loyal Serbian politicians in Slavonia, including parliamentary deputies and a mayor. In Zombor / 
Sombor and Szabadka in the Banat region, “where there has not been a trace of treasonous 
activity to be found” the military took hostages. In a final case, a military parade through 
Zombor / Sombor quickly fell apart as soldiers broke ranks to attack shops with Cyrillic signage. 
When one shopkeeper, a man by the name of Szamko Radoszavlyevics, cursed at the soldiers, 
they threw rocks at his shop, breaking the windows. Radoszavlyevics fired a shot from a 
revolver, hitting no one. He was arrested. The state prosecutor wanted to prosecute him under 
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civilian law, but before he could, the military commander tried and executed Radoszavlyvics in 
an Army court under military Standrecht. Tisza tried to intervene but was too late.
63
 
In response to his prime ministers' pressure, Franz Joseph released a Supreme Order on 
17 September which demanded the arrests of innocent persons cease: “I do not want that through 
unjustified arrests, loyal elements are driven to opposition against the state.”64 As that order was 
prepared, the War Ministry in Vienna sounded conciliation but vigorously defended its policies. 
The mass arrests had been necessary to prevent sabotage and smooth mobilization. That had 
largely happened. But now, “seven weeks after mobilization,” War Minister Krobatin opined in a 
letter to the emperor’s military chancellery, the recent spate of arrests “are not entirely clear to 
me, since all those persons who exposed themselves as having an attitude hostile to the state 
were rounded up at the beginning.”65 The military’s lukewarm response was met by a quickening 
of the civilian judicial organs in Slovenian areas. The Higher State Prosecutor’s office in Graz, 
which was responsible for overseeing the case against the citizens in Maria-Rast, eventually 
dropped the case for evidentiary reasons. Cases against some Slovenian priests and intellectuals 
were thrown out by regional judges after examining spurious denunciations and observing paltry 
evidence.  It was an example of the old, predictable Habsburg state winning a battle against the 
new, unpredictable one.
66
 But this case and countless others set the stage for a vast front of 
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internal conflicts between civilian authorities and the military over the management of the 
Habsburg state. 
War and the military’s interventions created a system of distrust that permeated society 
and government: not only between the military and the “Habsburg-loyal” Slovenes, but between 
civilian authorities and their military counterparts. A war for the soul of the state began. And 
once emergency measures of 1914 were implemented, they were not withdrawn. On paper, they 
were to ensure a smooth initial mobilization, but in the Habsburg Empire mobilization never 
ceased. Any plan to lift emergency legislation was abandoned as elites scrambled to deal with the 
repercussions of the Russian Army's incursion into the Empire. With Italy’s declaration of war in 
May 1915, the Habsburg Monarchy had completely transformed into a state of exception and 
paranoia.   
II. 
Military Law, Military Statecraft, and the Crisis of 1915  
The first nine months witnessed a series of military disasters for the Monarchy.  It failed 
to take Serbia after several invasion attempts, the last ending with a chaotic retreat from Belgrade 
in December 1914.  Russia occupied Galicia and Bukovina. The Army had sustained nearly one 
million casualties.
67
  Nonetheless, the Army commenced a winter offensive against Russia in the 
Carpathian Mountains. Intended to relieve several hundred thousand soldiers encircled in 
Przemyśl and brush Romania and Italy back from war, it failed spectacularly and Przemyśl fell 
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on March 23.  The Army took nearly 350,000 additional casualties in the first three months of 
1915.
68
 Austria-Hungary’s enormous losses and failures created a sense of foreboding and crisis 
and led Italy, thinking the time was right, to strike.  When it did in May 1915, the sense of crisis 
and the new geography of the front provided impetus for a continued expansion of emergency 
measures.  
As the military flashpoints of the external war shifted, new flashpoints arose in the 
internal war. They were most intense in the Southwest Front, responsible for the war against 
Italy. The command was cobbled out of portions of commands from Tyrol, the Austrian Littoral, 
including Trieste and the Slovene-speaking hinterland, and the Balkan fronts. The Southwest 
Front was led by Archduke Eugen, the brother of Archduke Friedrich and cousin to Franz 
Joseph. Eugen was resolute, dedicated, politically interested, and militarily competent.
69
  Under 
his leadership, the officers of the Southwest front exploited the powers that emergency measures 
bestowed on the Army vis-à-vis the Habsburg state. The Army assumed the prerogatives of the 
administration across Austria by mid-1915, including Tyrol. Now only the provinces of Lower 
and Upper Austria, Vienna, and Bohemia were outside the Army’s grasp when it came to 
usurping the imperial administration’s power. The command explicitly stated that its 
“mission...is not limited to the defeat of the Italian Army and the defense of the fatherland.  It 
goes further.”  It had to defeat the enemy “that had fixed itself within our territory” and this 
meant extending into the realm of statecraft within the Empire.
70
 Interestingly, several military 
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lawyers with expansive visions of the future constitution of the Habsburg state filled the 
command’s ranks. Most notable among these was Major Dr. Albin Schager who was heavily 
involved in the pre-war reform of military trial procedure.   
In this internal war, the Southwest Front Command turned to a favorite Army tool: 
application of military justice against civilians.  It forced through an expansion of Standrecht, a 
system of emergency law only to be invoked to secure the public order against the gravest 
threats. Trials run under Standrecht left only the possibility of acquittal or death, but Standrecht 
could only be declared for 48 hours. But the Army bristled against such limitations in their 
application of the law. Now, however, military courts could conduct investigations over an 
indefinite period and convene a trial under Standrecht once they assembled enough evidence.
71
  
It underscored the difficulty of limiting the reach of radically coercive legal structures which 
were to be sharply confined to a particular set of circumstances or limited in terms of time.  In 
this sense, the ever expanding Habsburg state of emergency had parallels with similarly 
expanding states of emergency in the extra-European colonial context.
72
  Yet within Europe, 
where civil-military relations were situated much more closely to the heart of imperial power, the 
British Army exhibited a greater sensitivity for the importance of procedural legality and for the 
legal limits of its power vis-à-vis the state in a state of emergency than the Habsburg Army.
73
   
                                                                                                                                                             
SW Front to the Kriegsministerium, 53-2/18, "Abwehrmaßnahmen gegen den Irredentismus," November 20, 1915, 
Karton 1789. 
71
 Oswald Überegger, Der andere Krieg: Die Tiroler Militärgerichtsbarkeit im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Innsbruck: Wagner, 2003), 96-97. 
72
 On martial law, the state of emergency, and the difficulty of containing its logic in the British colonial 
context, see Nassar Hussain’s explanation of the controversy around Armritsar massacre in 1919 in, Nassar Hussain, 
The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003), 99-132. 
73
 Charles Townshend, “Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain 
and the Empire, 1800–1940,” The Historical Journal 25, no. 1 (1982): 167–95; Charles Townshend, “Military Force 
and Civil Authority in the United Kingdom, 1914-1921,” Journal of British Studies 28, no. 3 (1989): 262–92. 
31 
 
As Oswald Überegger has shown, military law’s expansion shocked Tyrol because large 
portions of the province had been considered loyal to the Monarchy.  But it was the haphazard, 
random, and potentially deadly nature of military law under the Southwest Front that was most 
problematic.  Moreover, courts were encouraged to take the broader political atmosphere into 
account when deciding on cases.  As Ludovica Tait, the owner of a Gasthaus in South Tyrol 
discovered, merely displaying a damaged picture of Franz Joseph could land one in front of a 
court convened under Standrecht.  Sentenced to 5 years in prison with a day of fasting every 3 
months, Tait probably considered herself lucky.  Though the court found no evidence she 
intentionally damaged the picture or harbored anti-Monarchy sympathies, she had originally 
been sentenced to death because the “political atmosphere in the region” demanded that any 
“disrespect shown the Kaiser…be harshly confronted.”74   
Tait faced a trial, but many found themselves locked in holding pens waiting endlessly in 
a legal no man’s land.  The Army was always short of lawyers to handle the application of 
military law to civilians.  The demands of the war and an enormous operational army already 
stretched, but when one added civilians to the mix, the system became completely 
unmanageable.  In one instance, a military field court (Feldgericht) had 3 lawyers handling 429 
cases.  In Trient / Trento, in South Tyrol, 13 military lawyers were responsible for 1003 cases 
with a backlog of 6670 cases.
 75
 And here again the practice of wartime military law cut against 
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pre-war legal practice.  No longer was this the ordered Habsburg Rechtsstaat.  Attention to 
procedure and regularity disappeared in an overambitious, chronically understaffed system.  The 
guiding principle of military justice was rooting out dissent and opposition within a system of 
military discipline.
76
  The bureaucracy saw differences of opinion and opposition as part of a 
working civil society. The Army saw treason.  For officers, justice was not an end, but a means 
to put the vicissitudes and disunity of Austrian public life to rest.
77
  For the Army, the rule of law 
was a weapon to be wielded against society.  The rule of law’s symbolic neutrality made it 
accessible to being hijacked by an Army officer corps that put forth its own claims of neutral 
expertise. While the expert neutrality embodied in such its professional ethos could encourage 
retreat from society and governance, it also opened up avenues of approach for the military 
against society, especially when it came to positioning itself against the messy compromises 
intrinsic to the nineteenth-century constitutionalist project.
78
 
As such, the Army attempted to instrumentalize the rule of law in the Empire to its own 
political ends, moving into a space where a symbolic distance from state and society had been 
maintained by courts and the administration of justice. Baron Johann von Eichhoff, a civil 
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servant in the Interior Ministry, was the government liaison to the AOK.  Hardly a progressive 
bureaucrat, the Army’s attitude toward civilians and justice shocked him.  He recounts an 
exchange between a jurist and a corps commander about ten treason cases. The jurist responded 
that two merited investigation, but the other eight should be dismissed for evidentiary reasons.  
“The Corps Commandant then called for his aide-de-camp: ‘Here is a list of ten persons guilty of 
treason.  X and Y are to be taken over by Herr Lieutenant-Colonel [the jurist].  The others are to 
be shot immediately without trial.  This is my decision. [Turning to the military jurist]  As you 
can see, I’m not making any problems for you lawyers.’”79  Even in cases that adhered to 
military legal procedures, defendants were highly vulnerable. Leading Army legal officers 
reviewed wartime legal procedures in 1917 and noted that military courts often lacked the 
requisite legal expertise.  Usually only one of five officers on legal panels had judicial training.  
Moreover, line officers poorly understood legal arguments and often dismissed them.  
Representation for defendants was ineffectual and courts hard-wired to produce convictions.
80
   
But military courts were only the front end of a wedge which the Southwest Front and the 
Army used to punish perceived disloyalty and shut out the state administration.  Beyond military 
law, officers in the Southwest Front’s headquarters envisioned even more dramatic state 
transformation. Schager, the legal officer, gave concrete form to these visions in four extensive 
memoranda published as pamphlets and no doubt circulated among officers in the Southwest 
Front headquarters.  The war, a confident Schager argued, could be won militarily, but this 
meant nothing without addressing the internal rot perverting Austrian political life and state 
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administration.  The “influence” of political parties on the administration was to cease.  The 
municipalities (Gemeinden) stripped of autonomy and re-subordinated to the central state. The 
state administration in border regions required complete “cleansing.” Frequent rotations of state 
administrators would prevent the development of cozy relationships between politicians and 
bureaucrats.  The size of the state administration would be slashed.  These measures would 
overturn the entire political organization of the Empire since the 1867 Ausgleich, with its delicate 
balances between the central state and local autonomy.  Schager also wanted military legal 
jurisdiction over civilians to continue into peacetime for numerous offenses, including the elastic 
charge of “crimes against the war making power of the state.”  Anyone interned during the war, 
which included a considerable number of state officials and politicians, would lose all “political 
rights” in the post-war era.81  These texts foresaw a breathtaking transformation of the state and 
its relationship to society. Through the war, the Army would brutally and quickly break the 
bureaucracy’s mediating role in Austrian society. Without the bureaucracy performing a 
mediating role, according to Schager, the usual ways for national political groups to win 
concessions from the state would disappear.  
The difficulty involved in controlling this ever expanding state of emergency as it 
insisted on re-establishing what was believed to be a general condition of order was not 
something unique to Habsburg context.  Martin Geyer’s examination of the transition from the 
legal state of “state of siege” to a “state of emergency” in Imperial Germany during World War I 
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argues that architects of the “state of siege,” who envisioned it as way to control left-wing 
political dissent, were taken aback by the extent to which they quickly lost control over the state 
of emergency.  While Isabel Hull maintains that the system of governance in Imperial Germany 
provided an uncertain and fragile and uncertain context for civil-military relations prior to 1914, 
Geyer posits that the state of emergency combined with high levels of everyday mobilization 
undermined conservative anticipation of increased order.  Geyer argues that the state of 
emergency in Germany encouraged “a latent condition of anarchy and a Hobbesian struggle of 
all against all.”82  The conditions that Geyer describes in Imperial Germany did not mirror those 
of the Habsburg Empire, but in one essential element they were similar and that rested on the 
difficulty of controlling the state of emergency. 
While “reformers” like Schager wanted to use the state of exception to reorganize and 
reorder the Habsburg state, such changes would have required the complete capitulation of the 
state administration from the top down, from Stürgkh and Tisza to the local county and district 
administrators in Austria and Hungary. And as their resistance to the Army showed, this was not 
going to happen.
83
 Yet, the animating ideas behind such reform plans inspired hundreds of Army 
micro-moves against the state administration and political class and this conflict was waged 
often by local commanders and without the knowledge of their superiors. The Southwest Front 
and its constituent commands excelled at this, as they wedged their way into governance, 
attacking and denouncing the administration.  Even as late as fall 1916, Archduke Eugen 
routinely asserted his right to issue orders to the political administration and investigate officials 
suspected of disloyalty.  But even Eugen found it difficult to control the behavior of lower level 
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commanders; he asked them to cease interfering with the administration and refer such cases to 
his command first.
84
  The behavior of commanders on the Southwest Front, only tethered to their 
Army inflected sense of right and justice, destroyed the regularity of the Austrian state 
administration, one of its most appealing elements, and made the state itself appear dangerously 
unpredictable.
85
   
 In the Habsburg case, an increasingly unpredictable state under the sway of the state of 
exception became the norm.  Here the examples of Alfred von Fries-Skene, who became the 
Statthalter (governor) in Trieste and the Adriatic coast (Küstenland), and Christian Social 
politicians in Tyrol, are instructive.  In both cases, the Southwest Front’s leadership was not 
arrayed against the usual nationalist suspects.  Fries-Skene and the Christian Social Party were 
fiercely loyal to the Monarchy, but did not share the Army’s dim view of the Monarchy’s 
political practices and wished to maintain boundaries of the constitutional state.  Because he had 
pursued a hard line against nationalists in the province of Carinthia, Fries-Skene was dispatched 
to Trieste in February 1915 because of impending war with Italy.  While Fries-Skene found 
favor, at least initially, with the AOK, he quickly came under fire from the local leadership of the 
Southwest Front.
86
  They complained that he was weak, that his supposedly hard line against 
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Slovenian and Italian nationalists was not hard enough, and that, instead of using the new radical 
opportunities to cleanse the administration and political life that the war brought, he was 
reluctant to embrace “order and change.”87  When anonymous denunciations of Fries-Skene’s 
administration reached the Southwest Front leadership, it demanded he answer them.
 88
   Fries-
Skene reminded the Southwest Front that change “cannot come overnight” and “repressive 
measures” were ineffective.89  Archduke Eugen likewise sought to intervene in civilian personnel 
decisions and insisted that officials be removed from Fries-Skene’s administration because they 
were “slavophile sympathetic.”  This surprised Fries-Skene, who explained that these officials, 
though nationally inclined, had performed admirably in understaffed offices.
90
  Yet, it was these 
officials’ connections as conduits between the bureaucracy and political parties that was the real 
problem.  Any such connection had to be sheared according to Eugen and his fellow officers.  
Such interventions in the very fabric of compromise and cooperation made the state 
administration’s management of political parties almost impossible.91   
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Even those with “German” perspectives, which often could stand for a broader, imperial 
outlook, found themselves caught in the Army’s crosshairs.  In Tyrol, the Southwest Front 
demanded two Christian Social politicians stop travelling near the front without Army 
authorization.  The politicians wanted to meet their constituents, but the local commander, 
General Viktor Dankl, would have none of this.  He threatened both with trials under Standrecht 
if caught near the front again. The Southwest Front later banned one Christian Social deputy, 
Karl Niedrist, from Tyrol for the duration of the war. Niedrist, complained Eugen, incited the 
local population against the military. He made fun of the War Minister and encouraged local 
farmers to hide their livestock from the Army. The Statthalter in Innsbruck responded that 
Niedrist and other deputies were not anti-military and only represented their constituents vis-à-
vis the state in line with pre-war practice. In response, Eugen called these travels “agitation trips” 
that interfered with “political and military administration” and refused to lift the ban.92 
By 1917, the Army failed in its bid to take over the state, but its efforts had unraveled the 
Austrian state that had evolved over the past five decades.  In the process, the Army created a 
rickety and dangerous half-state which undermined functioning relationships and networks from 
peacetime.  Rule of law was no longer a neutral space separate from state and society as the 
Army increasingly arrogated this space to itself.  The Army directed an overburdened, 
potentially fearsome, unpredictable, and ever expanding system of military law against imperial 
civil society, undermining a cornerstone of Habsburg sovereignty.   
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The extent to which the Army had wrecked the state only became fully apparent as the 
Army was compelled to loosen its grips.  In the fall of 1916 Stürgkh’s assassination, Franz 
Joseph’s death, and a new Emperor, Karl, sparked a series of changes.  Karl dismissed the 
aggressive Conrad as chief of the AOK and in May 1917 he recalled the Reichsrat (Parliament) 
in Austria that had been out of session since February 1914.  The first half year of Karl’s reign 
was marked by tumult within the highest reaches of the imperial government. Karl initially toyed 
with the idea, cooked in the pots of conservative politicians and German nationalists from 
Bohemia, that he would reform the monarchy by decree, or Octroi.  This included proclaiming 
German as the official language of administration and enacting constitutional and administrative 
changes to restructure the Reichsrat, limiting political parties’ capacity for obstructionism.  Karl 
wisely chose not to serve the dish.
93
  And yet the radical elements of the scheme also revealed 
how the preceding years of Army interventions into the state dramatically widened the sense of 
what was possible.
94
  Whereas the political space of pre-war reform plans was bounded by 
delicate balances and complex tradeoffs among political parties and the administration—
otherwise known as cooperation and compromise--the wartime political space the Army left 
behind was dominated by radical solutions to perceived “problems.”   
Karl hoped reconvening the Reichsrat would stabilize the state in Austria.  Yet, what Karl 
could not resurrect were pre-1914 political practices. Not only did the Reichsrat prove a disaster 
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after a few weeks, but many deputies fused the Army and the state administration together into a 
single entity of repression. The state administration’s failure to deter the Army’s interventions 
became something more sinister in these portrayals.  It was now an enabler of the Army’s war on 
Habsburg civil society.  Thus Austria’s internal war and the military-bureaucratic conflict that 
comprised it, shredded the state’s legitimacy and destroyed pre-war political practices.  The 
quasi-democratic management of the Reichsrat or the projection of the Reichsrat’s authority into 
the state, made possible through the cozy relationship between political parties and the state 
administration prior to 1914, was impossible.  That was apparent from the moment the Reichsrat 
reconvened.  Many of the returning delegates, especially those from areas that had felt the heavy 
hand of the Army, undermined the government’s efforts to manage and moderate the opening 
statements of various parliamentary factions.  František Staněk threatened the Army and state 
administration, promising that the Reichsrat would investigate both for “rapes, when it came to 
Slavic nationalities.”  Even Prime Minister Heinrich Clam-Martinic’s statement honoring the war 
dead became an avenue of attack.  A leading Slovenian deputy, Anton Korošec, stated “we 
mourn them….but that hundreds and hundreds had to waste away in prison at the beginning of 
the war as the result of national hate, that many innocents were condemned, some even to death, 
that, Gentlemen, we will never forget, that will burn like a deeply painful wound.”  This did not 
mean a break from the Monarchy, but Korošec claimed that everyone wanted the bureaucrats and 
officers behind such persecution dealt with.  Another speaker condemned the Army, describing 
its soldiers as a “Soldatska,” invoking memories of the out of control soldiery from the Thirty 
Years War. 
95
 Lothar Höbelt argues the Reichsrat of 1917 and 1918 could finally “practice 
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normal parliamentary politics” by avoiding obstruction and encouraging coalitions.96 But the 
Reichsrat made little effort to look forward.  Rather than mobilizing support for the imperial 
state, a reopened Reichsrat became a mobilizing point against it.
97
  
One can view the opening of parliament as the last in a long line of difficult reform 
projects, most begun well before the war and all underlined by the state’s refusal to recognize the 
need for national autonomy across the Empire. But such a view reduces the war and the Army’s 
interventions in the first 2 1/2 years to events that only exacerbated problems already present in 
the Monarchy. We argue that war made its own unique crises, crises that destroyed the rule of 
law and the predictability and solidity of the Habsburg state. These crises were not a product of a 
long term imperial flaw, but of the Army’s emasculation of the state administration and the 
internecine conflict between the Army and state since the war’s start.   
Conclusion 
After the war ended, an Austrian commission investigated the Army’s wartime misdeeds.  
One investigation focused on Major General (Feldmarschalleutnant) Alois Pokorny.  Soldiers 
under Pokorny’s command were sent to Lipice in Galicia on August 14, 1914 to investigate 
flashes of light coming from the village.  As a prank, though ill-advised, the mentally disabled 
Johann Grecko entertained villagers by blowing gasoline into a lighted match, creating intense 
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flashes of light.  Pokorny’s overzealous soldiers believed Grecko signaled Russian units and 
arrested him for treason.  With Russian units 12 to 13 kilometers away and Lipice in a valley, it 
was an inauspicious spot for signaling.  The military court’s preliminary investigations cast 
doubt on the charges.  Pokorny believed this reflected insufficient appreciation for the security 
situation in Galicia and ordered a summary court to retry Grecko. “When we don’t ruthlessly 
proceed against this scum,” Pokorny exclaimed, “they are going to overwhelm us.”  The court 
sentenced Grecko to ten years in prison, a lighter sentence because doubts about Grecko’s age 
ruled out the death penalty. This case, according to the Austrian post-war commission, 
exemplified extra-legal wartime practices. “The war,” the Commission explained, “was a 
destroyer of moral values, in particular it also gravely undermined the legal order.” It undercut 
“sympathy for legality among the populace” within post-war Austria and, one might add, in the 
other Habsburg successor states.
98
  
We have argued that, in many ways, the Habsburg Empire was no outlier among 
belligerents in the First World War. Like the other states, it suspended constitutional government 
through a state of emergency to help prosecute a war and manage the home front as the stakes of 
winning and losing became higher and higher. And, increasingly, its administration and political 
elites fought a battle against an Army that used the war and the state of exception to attempt a 
transformation of the state and larger society. Unlike France or Germany, the Habsburg Empire, 
after more than four years and three months of war, collapsed utterly and vanished from the map.   
The question of why the Habsburg Empire collapsed is a complex one to be sure. Hunger and the 
continuing sacrifices that war enacted on the populace were great, as were the attempts of the 
Entente to entice its nationalities away from supporting the Empire. But we believe at the most 
                                                 
98
 AVA, Justiz JM, Signatur VI/1, Pflichtverletzungen im Kriege, Deutsch-österr. Staatsamt für Justiz, Z 
1282/8, May 16, 1920, Karton 3451. 
43 
 
fundamental level the state of exception and the instrumentalization of law irreparably changed 
the Habsburg Empire and destroyed the basis of its legitimacy. For the modern Habsburg Empire 
was built, since the days of Maria Theresa, by the Habsburgs and its bureaucracy on the principle 
of standardization and centralization and the idea that the law could be a neutral space, accessible 
to varying peoples and groups. As Pieter Judson admirably tells us in his recent magnum opus, 
this standardization push of Enlightened Absolutism resulted in an administration and a populace 
alike that was “extremely sensitive to issues of formal legality.”99  This role for rule of law, in 
idea if not always in practice, existed not only in purportedly democratic Western states, but also 
in European states such as Tsarist Russia or beyond to Qing China or British India as David 
Gilmartin and Jonathan Ocko have argued.
100
  Prior to the war, the rule of law helped ease 
Habsburg society’s acceptance of the state’s political projects and compromises. Moreover, 
nationalist politicians and movements depended on the rule of law to protect them from majority 
rule and to regulate their relationship to each other. The type of infrastructural power that 
undergirded these projects and compromises, as Michael Mann argues, was simultaneously 
constructed against assertions of despotic power by particularistic societal elites.
101
  But war 
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changed the way law functioned in the Empire and in Europe. The Army’s antipolitical habitus, 
through its claims to being apolitical and neutral, gave it easy access to the similar space 
occupied by rule of law.  Law even gave form if not content to the Army’s interventions as 
demonstrated by its preference for the expansion of military law within the Empire as a coercive 
tool.  The Army, however, instrumentalized the space occupied by rule of law on behalf of its 
vision of a radically reworked Habsburg state and society. And it was this instrumentalization 
that the nineteenth-century constitutional state had such difficulty handling in the Habsburg case. 
Like the proverbial canary in the mine, the Habsburg Empire, given the centrality of rule 
of law to its legitimacy, was more sensitive than most to the poison gases that the First World 
War unleashed.
102
 As the world descended into the twentieth century, the Habsburg canary died. 
That subsequent historiography has blamed the Habsburg state, as anachronistic, or unfit to live, 
is yet another legacy of the twentieth century and the violence and devastation that the 
abandonment of the Rechtsstaat wrought. 
The First World War claimed the Rechtsstaat as one of its silent casualties. Eastern 
Europe experienced the afterlives of rule of law’s collapse and law’s instrumentalization most 
directly, weakening legal structures across the region in spite of post-war efforts to create 
constitutional states with international oversight through the League of Nations when it came to 
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minorities.
103
  Whether one examines interwar Austria, Poland after Piłsudski’s coup d’état in 
1926, or Yugoslavia after the imposition of a military dictatorship by King Alexander, just to 
name a few, extra-legal solutions were no rarity in Eastern Europe. World War II accelerated the 
weakness of legal structures in Eastern Europe, as Jan Gross argued.
104
  Fixing the collapse of 
rule of law in the first half of the twentieth century in Eastern Europe in the Habsburg Army's 
actions during World War I creates a historical point of origin around political decisions as 
opposed to placing the collapse within an essentialized pathology of the region characterized by 
excessive nationalism, developmental deficits, or dependence on external actors.
105
 
The instrumentalization of legality during the war resonated beyond post-war Habsburg 
Eastern Europe. Problems emerging out of the nexus that straddled rule of law and civil-military 
relations cropped up again and again over the twentieth century.  Could the vestiges of the 
nineteenth-century constitutional state maintain the rule of law as a neutral space separate from 
state and society amidst wartime crisis and fraught civil-military relations?  The First World War 
expanded the reach of emergency laws, once considered separate from the rule of law, and they 
became increasingly permanent conditions, warping and discrediting the constitutional state and 
its claims.  It is no accident that intellectual genealogies of the state of emergency that assert that 
it is constitutive of the rule of law, such as that argued for by Carl Schmitt, are themselves 
                                                 
103
 Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority 
Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also the recent work Robert Gerwarth, 
The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016).  
104
 Jan T. Gross, “Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of Imposition of Communist 
Regimes in East Central Europe,” East European Politics & Societies 3, no. 2 (March 1989): 198–214. 
105
 Jörg Baberowski and Dietrich Beyrau, Moderne Zeiten?: Krieg, Revolution und Gewalt im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Jörg Baberowski and Gabriele Metzler, Gewalträume: 
Soziale Ordnungen im Ausnahmezustand, vol. 20, Eigene und Fremde Welten (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2012); 
Jörg Baberowski, David Feest, and Christoph Gumb, Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz: Repräsentationen 
Politischer Macht im Späten Zarenreich, vol. 11, Eigene und fremde Welten (Frankfurt: Campus, 2008); Timothy 
Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Ivan T. Behrend, The Crisis 
Zone of Europe: An Interpretation of East-Central European History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, 
trans. Adrienne Makkay-Chambers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 49-71. 
46 
 
products of the First World War era.
106
  Whether in Latin America at moments from the 1950s 
through the 1980s, the United States of the late 1940s, or the United States in the midst of the 
war on terror and the invasion of Iraq, those states that maintained a deep constitutional and legal 
heritage from the nineteenth century found themselves facing similar crises, though they availed 
themselves of a range of solutions to these crises.
107
 As these crises brought forth an increasing 
instrumentalization of law we can ask if the twentieth century's history could be written in terms 
of the erratic and contingent destruction of the constitutional state and not as a narrative of the 
rise of extremist modernizing ideologies like communism or fascism. Such a narrative as we are 
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suggesting helps to link the twentieth century with a previous Age of Revolutions from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that pushed for constitutionalist states along with an 
emphasis on the rule of law.
108
  Moreover, it has the potential to link elements of the crisis 
surrounding the First World War and rule of law in the early twentieth century, with its charges 
of a plodding, slow moving Habsburg state built on tedious, legalistic compromises forward to 
the contemporary crisis of the European Union where the same charges fill the atmosphere.  A 
narrative of the twentieth century that focuses on the fall of that nineteenth-century state and the 
legal architecture surrounding it, would be well advised to consider the experience of the 
Habsburg Empire not as an aberration but as an instructive and intensified example of what was 
to come. 
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